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Abstract. A growing number of threats to Android phones creates chal-
lenges for malware detection. Manually labeling the samples into benign
or different malicious families requires tremendous human efforts, while
it is comparably easy and cheap to obtain a large amount of unlabeled
APKs from various sources. Moreover, the fast-paced evolution of An-
droid malware continuously generates derivative malware families. These
families often contain new signatures, which can escape detection when
using static analysis. These practical challenges can also cause traditional
supervised machine learning algorithms to degrade in performance.
In this paper, we propose a framework that uses model-based semi-
supervised (MBSS) classification scheme on the dynamic Android API
call logs. The semi-supervised approach efficiently uses the labeled and
unlabeled APKs to estimate a finite mixture model of Gaussian distri-
butions via conditional expectation-maximization and efficiently detects
malwares during out-of-sample testing. We compare MBSS with the pop-
ular malware detection classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM),
k-nearest neighbor (kNN) and linear discriminant analysis (LDA). Under
the ideal classification setting, MBSS has competitive performance with
98% accuracy and very low false positive rate for in-sample classifica-
tion. For out-of-sample testing, the out-of-sample test data exhibit simi-
lar behavior of retrieving phone information and sending to the network,
compared with in-sample training set. When this similarity is strong,
MBSS and SVM with linear kernel maintain 90% detection rate while
kNN and LDA suffer great performance degradation. When this similar-
ity is slightly weaker, all classifiers degrade in performance, but MBSS
still performs significantly better than other classifiers.
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1 Introduction
Android had dominated the mobile operating system and accounted for over
86% of global shipment and operating system market share in 2016 [4] [11]. The
Androids official application store, Google Play, provides over 2.7 million appli-
cations [9] and total download count had reached 65 billion times in one year
period [5]. The popularity of Android operating system has made it a lucrative
target for cybercriminals. According to McAfees 2016 mobile threat report, there
have been 9 millions of malware found from app stores cross 190 countries glob-
ally in three month period. And 3 million devices were affected over 6 months
period [7]. The average monthly infection rate among smartphones increased to
0.49 percent in the first half of 2016. This is a 98 percent surge from the 0.25
percent in the second half of 2015 based on Nokia Threat Intelligence labs report
[8].
The rampant evolution of Android malware makes it more sophisticated to
avoid detection and more difficult to classify using the commonly-used machine
learning algorithms. Human effort of labeling the malware as malicious or be-
nign cannot keep up with the pace of the voluminous generation of Android
malware, resulting in an imbalance of much more unlabeled data than labeled
data. For supervised learning algorithms, this causes potential difficulties, since
these algorithms are constructed merely on the labeled dataset or training data,
but are desired to have reasonably good performance on the greater amount of
unlabeled data.
Furthermore, due to this imbalance of unlabeled and labeled data, the dis-
tribution observed from the labeled data can be different from the actual data
distribution. This is seen in malware detection, as study suggests that mal-
ware family exhibit polymorphic behaviors. Translated into machine learning,
it implies that at testing phase, the test data can be similarly distributed as
the training data, but is not identically distributed as the training data. Tradi-
tional supervised machine learning algorithms can suffer performance degrada-
tion when tested on samples that do not distribute identically as the training
data. Therefore, in order to achieve a robust malware detection rate for out-of-
sample malware detection, it is desired to have a machine learning based malware
detector that takes advantage of both unlabeled and labeled data, and maintains
a steady performance for out-of-sample test analysis.
To address the above challenges, in this paper, we propose a framework of
utilizing model-based semi-supervised (MBSS) classification on the dynamic be-
havior data for Android malware detection. We focus on detecting malicious
behavior at runtime by using dynamic behavior data for our analysis. The main
advantage of semi-supervised classification is the strong robustness in perfor-
mance for out-of-sample testing. The model-based semi-supervised classification
uses both labeled and unlabeled data to estimate the parameters, since unlabeled
data usually carries valuable information on the model fitting procedure.
Specifically, we use mixture modeling to achieve the classification task. Mix-
ture modeling is a type of machine learning technique, which assumes that every
component of the mixture represent a given set of observations in the entire
collection of data. Gaussian mixture modeling is the most popularly used ap-
plied and studied technique. Model-based mixture modeling uses a mixture of
Gaussian distributions to develop clustering, classification and semi-supervised
learning methods [14], [27], [26], [23].
We run the Android applications in our emulator infrastructure and harvest
the API calls at runtime. Our framework efficiently uses the labeled and un-
labeled behavior data to estimate a set of finite mixture models of Gaussian
distributions via conditional expectation-maximization, and uses the Bayesian
information criterion for model selection. We compare MBSS with the popular
malware detection classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM), k-nearest
neighbor (kNN) and linear discriminant analysis (LDA). We demonstrate that
MBSS has competitive performance for in-sample classification, and maintains
strong robustness when applied for out-of-sample testing. We consider semi-
supervised learning on dynamic Android behavior data a practical and valuable
addition to Android malware detection.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe
related work of machine learning used in Android malware detection. In Section
3, we describe our infrastructure and implementation for our Android malware
emulator, which collects the dynamic behavioral data for our analysis. In Section
4, we describe in detail the model-based semi-supervised classifier. In Section 5,
we present the results of our proposed methodology for three sets of experiments
to demonstrate its effectiveness for out-of-sample testing. We conclude our paper
with summary and discussion in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The intersection of artificial intelligence and statistics provides machine learning
the foundation of probabilistic models and data-driven parameter estimation.
Machine learning tasks can be categorized into supervised learning, unsuper-
vised learning and semi-supervised learning. In supervised learning, the learning
task is to classify the labels of incoming data samples given the observed training
data and their labels. Traditional methods include nearest neighbor [21], sup-
port vector machine [20], decision tree [42], sparse representation classifier [46]
[19], etc. In unsupervised learning, the learning problem is to group the obser-
vations into categories based on a chosen similarity measure. Typical methods
include K-means, expectation-maximization [24], [37], model-based clustering
[27], [18], hierarchical clustering [32], spectral clustering [38] [34], and so on.
Semi-supervised is between supervised and unsupervised learning, where the
learning problem makes use of the unlabeled for training and updates the model
using both the labeled and unlabeled data. Typical methods include Gaussian
mixture models [36], hidden Markov model, low-density separation [17], and so
on.
There are various techniques used to detect malware on Android system.
They generally could be classified as static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis
techniques focus on the information from Android application package (APK)
such as manifest, resources, code binary, etc., while dynamic analysis techniques
focus on dynamic behaviors collected during APK execution.
Previous work such as CHEX [33] statically checks the code logic to prevent
component hijacking attacks that might cause privacy leakage. MAMADROID
[35] and DroidAPIMiner [12] both use Android API invocations in static code to
detect malware. While static techniques are more prevalent among anti-malware
companies, they are known to fail to detect malwares with sophisticated evasion
techniques like dynamic code loading or code obfuscation. MYSTIQUE-S [47] is
a sample malware, which can select attack features at runtime, and download
malicious payloads dynamically. It bypasses static detection and can only be
detected by dynamic monitoring tools such as Droidbox [2].
DroidHunter [44], FLEXDROID [43] and Going native [13] are a few exam-
ples on dynamic detection techniques. DroidHunter is able to detect malicious
code loading by hooking critical android runtime API. FLEXDROID proposes
an extra component in Android app manifest, which allows developers to set
permissions on native code. Going Native generates policies for native code and
limits malicious behaviors. On the other hand, several dynamic monitoring tools
are proposed on Android malware detection. Droidbox [2] and Droidmon [3] are
both based on instrumentations in android runtime. Droidbox relies on source
code modification of Android Open Source Project (AOSP), thus suffers from
huge engineering works of porting various Android versions. Droidmon instead is
based on Xposed Framework, which is a framework for modules that can change
the behavior of APK without modifying it
One downside of dynamic analysis is the limited code coverage as some be-
haviors only exposed under specific conditions such as user interactions or sensor
data. IntelliDroid [45] tries to solve this problem using symbolic execution. It
leverages a solver to generate targeted input to trigger malicious code logic and
increase the coverage. However, its implementation is bound to Android version,
and may suffer from the porting issue.
Similar to Droidmon, our instrumentation framework Android Emulator (AE)
is based on Xposed Framework for dynamic API monitoring. Also several com-
ponents, such as the UI automation tool and sensor emulators, were incorporated
in AE to enhanced coverage of dynamic behavior. Tracing logs of APK execution
were harvested for future machine learning analysis.
3 Data Generation and Preparation
Malicious and benign APKs were downloaded from VirusTotal and Google Play
respectively. Both samples were uploaded to our emulator infrastructure for ex-
ecution, as seen in Figure 1. The Android emulator (AE) runs in a emulator ma-
chine. Each machine may contains multiple emulators. The downloaded APKs
were dispatched by the scheduler and installed to new emulator instances for
execution. Since most of Android applications are UI-based, merely launching
the application may be insufficient to expose its behaviors. The automation tool
is developed to provide simulated human interactions, such as clicks, and sen-
sor events, such as GPS location. This tool could navigate the UI automatically
without human intervention. We harvest applications behaviors through Android
Debug Bridge (ADB) [1] and aggregate them into the disk.
Fig. 1: Dynamic Instrumentation System Architecture.
To address the trade-off between efficiency and completeness, we set our ex-
periment time for each APK as 10 minutes. To harvest the API calls at runtime,
our customized emulator has pre-installed Xposed framework [10] which could
potentially hook any API invocations to android runtime. Our Xposed compo-
nent is running along with each application instance and intercept and print
each API invocation through ADB [1], which is further harvested by a dedicated
out-of-box process. Since Android application is mostly UI-based, launching the
application is insufficient to harvest enough behavior. To cope with it, we used
a UI automation tool playing as a robot to dynamically click the running APK
inside emulator. As a result, we could navigate most of the application logic with
largely reduced the human effort.
We capture dynamic behavior of each android application by executing it in
our emulator. The dynamic data consists of a time sequence of API calls made
by an application to the Android runtime. Since current Android runtime export
more than 50K APIs, for efficiency, we carefully select 160 API calls that are
critical to change Android system state such as sending short messages, accessing
website, reading contact information, etc. Our selection of Android API function
comes from the union of function set selected by three well-known open source
projects: AndroidEagleEye [6], Droidmon [3], and Droidbox [2]. We believe our
API selection set is sufficient to cover all critical Android malicious behaviors
at runtime. For each API call, we capture the API class name and its function
name.
As a result, our data consists of the dynamic traces of the APKs as samples,
and the feature space of our data set is the collection of APIs, where in each
feature, we denote the existence of the API in the sample APK. That is, suppose
the unique number of API calls is d, then a sample APK is represented by
x = (0, 0, .., 1, .., 1, .., 0) ∈ {0, 1}d, where 1 denotes the existence of an API call
and 0 otherwise.
4 Model-based semi-supervised classification
Even if a classifier achieves high classification accuracy and low false positive
rate for in-sample testing, its good performance may not be extended to out-
of-sample testing. Semi-supervised learning classification uses both the labeled
and unlabeled to update the classifier, taking advantage of the complete dataset
and thus achieving more accurate classification. Here we propose to use the
model-based semi-supervised (MBSS) classification algorithm [23], [41], [27]. We
start with formulating the semi-supervised classification task, then explain the
conditional expectation-maximization algorithm used for solving the maximum
likelihood problem, and describe the model selection criterion.
4.1 The Semi-supervised Learning Task
In the supervised setting, we define [K] = {1, 2, ...,K} for a given positive
integer K. Suppose (X,Y ) ∼ FXY , where X is a feature vector in Rd and
Y ∈ [K] is the class label, and FXY is the joint distribution of X and Y . Fur-
ther suppose we observe the independently identically distributed training data
Tn = ({Xn}, {Yn)} := {(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), ..., (Xn, Yn)} i.i.d∼ FXY . The task is to
classify the class membership of sample X via defining a classifier g : X → Y
[25].
In the unsupervised setting, we observe independently identically distributed
feature vectors X1, X2, ..., Xn where each Xi is a random variable for some prob-
ability space. The task is to cluster the samples into groups based a chosen metric
of similarity.
The semi-supervised setting is between supervised and unsupervised learning.
Denote the incoming data by Xm = {Xn+1, ..., Xn+m} with unknown labels and
use the same notation Tn as the training data. The task is to learn a classifier
g : X → Y such that this classifier predicts the labels of Xm via learning from
the complete data rather than the labeled training data alone.
4.2 Model-based Semi-supervised Learning Framework
In model-based approach, the data x is assumed to be distributed from a mixture
density f(x)=
∑K
k=1 pikfk(x), where fk(·) is the density from the k-th group and
pik is the probability that an observation belongs to group k. Each component is
Gaussian, which is characterized by its mean µk and covariance matrix Σk. The
probability density function for the k-th component is thus
fk = fk(x, µk, σk) =
exp(− 12 (x− µk)TΣ−1k (x− µk))√
det(2piΣk)
. (1)
The mean µ = (µ1, ..., µK), covariance matrix Σ = (Σ1, ..., ΣK) and the
population distribution pi = (pi1, ..., piK) are the parameters to be estimated from
the mixture models. Here we use maximum likelihood estimation, a method of
finding the parameters to maximize the probability of obtaining the observations
given the parameters.
Denote θ := (µ,Σ) as all the parameters in the Gaussian components. Hence
we want to estimate pi and θ. Denote Xn = {X1, ..., Xn} as the training data and
Yn = {Y1, ..., Yn} as the training labels, where for the i-th observation, denote
Yik = 1 if the observation comes from group k and 0 otherwise. Denote the
unknown labels of the unlabeled data as YM = {Yn+1, ..., Yn+m}. The likelihood
of the training data is
LT (pi, θ|Xn,Yn,Xm) = Πni=1ΠKk=1[pikf(Xi|θk)]Yi,kpin+mj=n+1
K∑
k=1
pikf(Xj |θk). (2)
To estimates the unknown parameters pi and θ, one calculates log-likelihood as
l(pi, θ) = logLT (pi, θ) and uses the EM algorithm [24], [37] to maximize the
log-likelihood.
In our framework, we apply model-based semi-supervised classification using
both labeled and unlabeled Android behavioral data to develop the classification
decision for the unlabeled data. The likelihood of the complete-data consisting
of labeled and unlabeled data is
LC(pi, θ|Xn,Yn,Xm,Ym) = Πni=1ΠKk=1[pikf(xi|θk)Yik ]Πn+mj=n+1ΠKk=1[pikf(Xj |θk)]Yjk .
(3)
Essentially we treat the data with unknown labels as missing data to include
them in the complete likelihood. To estimate the unknown parameters and maxi-
mize the log-likelihood of the complete data, we use the conditional expectation-
maximization (CEM) algorithm [31], which is similar to the expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm.
4.3 The Conditional Expectation-Maximization Algorithm
The conditional expectation-maximization (CEM) [31] algorithm is used to solve
the likelihood maximization on the complete data. We note that CEM is sim-
ilar to EM, except we update the classification using both labeled and unla-
beled data. We denote the parameter estimates at the g-th iteration by pˆig, θˆg =
(µˆg, Σˆg) and the estimated label on the test data at the g-th iteration by Yˆ gm.
– Step 1: Initialization. Set g = 0 and initiate starting estimates pˆi0, θˆ0 us-
ing model-based discriminant analysis estimates from the parameters of the
model, as described in [27].
– Step 2: Expectation. While chosen stopping criterion is not satisfied, in-
crease iteration g. Calculate the expected value of the unknown labels via
wjk =
pikf(Xj |θˆgk)
ΣKk=1pˆi
g
kf(Xm|θˆgk)
, (4)
where k ∈ [K] denotes the index of the number of class memberships and
j = n+ 1, ..., n+m denotes the index on the unlabeled data.
– Step 3: Maximization. The estimated labels after the g-th iteration is
Yˆ g+1jk := sign(wjk − wjk′) for all k 6= k′. Estimate the mixture parameters
by
pˆig+1k =
∑n
i=1 lik +
∑n+m
j=n+1 Yˆ
g+1
jk
n+m
, (5)
µˆg+1k =
∑n
i=1 likXi +
∑n+m
j=n+1 Yˆ
g+1
jk∑n
i=1 lik +
∑n+m
j=n+1 Yˆ
(g+1)
jk
. (6)
To estimate the covariance, we apply eigenvalue decomposition on the co-
variance matrix Σk, i.e., Σk = λkDkAkD
T
k . Depending on which covariance
structure is, seen in Section 4.4, different constraints are imposed on the
covariance matrix. [15], [16] describe in detail how each covariance matrix is
estimated according to the structure.
– Step 4: Convergence. Stop until stopping criteria is met.
In this study, the stopping criterion is set when the current value of the
log-likelihood is within 10−5 close to the estimated final converged value. Upon
convergence, the fitted mixture model will produce the posterior probability of
the group memberships Yjk, where j = n + 1, ..., n + m and k ∈ [K] for the
unlabeled data. The categorical classification is done such that the observations
belong to the class with the maximum posterior probability.
4.4 Model Selection
The CEM algorithm estimates the parameters µ,Σ, pi. The regions or clusters
centered at µ characterize the data generated from mixture of Gaussian dis-
tributions. The shapes of these regions or clusters are determined by the co-
variance matrices Σ. In [14], eigen-decomposition on the covariance matrix,
Σk = λkDkAkD
T
k , has geometric interpretations: Dk is an orthogonal matrix
consisting of the eigenvectors of Σk, determining the orientation of k-th compo-
nent; Ak is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues in the diagonal, determining
the shape; and λk are the eigenvalues, determining the size of the group. For ex-
ample, when all components are of the same size and spherical, the imposed
constraint is Σk = λI. If the components are spherical but of different sizes, the
imposed constraint is Σk = λkI.
As a result, different shapes of the mixture components lead to a different
parametrization of the covariance matrix, and thus different mixture models.
Here we consider the set of models listed in [28], [29], [23], [41] and use the
Bayesian Information criterion (BIC) for model selection. The BIC is given by
BIC(Mi) = 2 logLC − ln(n+m)l, (7)
where logLC is the maximum likelihood of the complete data, n + m is the
number of obeservations, and l is the number of parameters. The optimal model
is selected based on the maximum BIC [23], [27], [40].
4.5 Summarizing our framework
Our framework of model-based semi-supervised classification for dynamic An-
droid malware analysis is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Model-based semi-supervised classification on dynamic Android
behavior
Goal: Predict the label of Android APKs.
Input: Android APKs. MBSS convergence stopping criterion.
Step 1: Emulation. Execute APKs, and output API names to logs.
Step 2: Data generation. Process logs and extract selected API names.
Step 3: Feature extraction. Engineer features from API names.
Step 4: MBSS Model-based semi-supervised classification on extracted features of
API logs.
Step 5: Classification Classify APKs into groups based on the maximum posterior
probability from MBSS.
5 Results
We compare MBSS with some of the most popular malware classifiers: support
vector machine, k-nearest neighbor, and linear discriminant analysis. We conduct
two categories of experiments: in-sample validation and out-of-sample validation.
In-sample validation is the typical classification setting where a dataset is split
into training and test set. A classifier is trained on the training set and expected
to perform well when tested on the test set. Cross validation is usually em-
ployed to assess the performance of a classifier. In-sample classification provides
the ideal classification scenario, where test data distribution is the same as the
training data distribution.
Our next set of experiments focuses on out-of-sample testing. An out-of-
sample experiment uses the classifier trained and validated on the in-sample
data, and predicts the labels of incoming unlabeled data. The vast majority of
the unlabeled data are not guaranteed to follow the same distribution as the in-
sample training data. This is a challenge for machine learning algorithms used for
practical applications. We consider a classifier robust and practical when it can
still achieve reasonably well performance for out-of-sample classification. All the
APKs for our experiments are retrieved from VirusTotal, and the experiments
are conducted in R [39], [41], [29].
5.1 Dataset
We use the dynamic logs obtained from our Android emulator as described in
Section 3. The behavior data contains the filtered API calls during the execution
of runs. The set of unique API calls constitute the feature space. Each data
sample APK is represented by the binary feature vector denoting existence of
an API call. For example, suppose the unique number of API calls is d, then a
sample APK is represented by x = (0, 0, .., 1, .., 1, .., 0) ∈ {0, 1}d, where 1 denotes
the existence of an API call and 0 otherwise.
5.2 In-sample validation
We first demonstrate that for in-sample classification, MBSS has competitive
performance when compared with SVM with radial kernel, SVM with linear
kernel, 3NN and LDA, all of which are most widely used for malware classifica-
tion.
As in-sample dataset, we obtain 55994 Android APK dynamic logs from
our emulator with 24217 benign Android APKs and 31777 malicious APKs.
The in-sample malicious behaviors include stealing location, device ID, MAC
information, dynamic code loading behavior, and sending the information to
outside network. The label distribution is (43%, 57%) and the chance accuracy
(classification accuracy when randomly guessing) is 0.57. We first validate the
effectiveness of all five classifiers.
We conduct 10-fold cross validation, report the accuracy mean by averaging
the accuracies and calculate the standard deviation of the accuracies across all
the 10 folds validation, and report the similar metrics for false positive rates.
As indicated in Table 1, all the classifiers have competitive performance. Under
this ideal classification scenario, SVM with radial and linear kernels demonstrate
the best performance with accuracies at 98.8% and 98.6% respectively and false
positive rates both at 2%, 3NN and MBSS have similar performance of accuracy
at 97.6% and 97.9% respectively and false positive rate at 3%, while LDA shows
lesser performance with accuracy at 90% and false positive at 6%. Figure 2 shows
the receiver operating curve (ROC) of MBSS in the 10-th fold classification and
the area under the curve is 0.99.
Classifier Mean ACC Sd ACC Mean FP Sd FP DR for OOS1 DR for OOS2
MBSS 97.6% 0.002 3% 0.004 90.0% 55.3%
SVM (radial) 98.8% 0.002 1.8% 0.003 0 0.06%
SVM (linear) 98.6% 0.001 2% 0.003 90.8% 35.4%
3NN 97.9% 0.001 3% 0.004 68.4% NA
LDA 90.0% 0.003 6% 0.003 9.4% 33.8%
Table 1: Classification performance comparison for all five classifiers. All classifiers
have competitive classification performance for in-sample testing. For OOS1, MBSS
and SVM with linear kernel achieve the highest detection rate. For OOS2, MBSS
performs significantly better than all other classifiers. Due to too many ties for 3NN,
we do not report its result here.
Fig. 2: The receiver operating curve (ROC) of MBSS for in-sample classification. The
area under the curve is 0.99.
5.3 Out-of-sample classification
Our next experiment is out-of-sample validation. For our out-of-sample classi-
fication experiment, we apply the five classifiers on a test dataset consisting of
all malicious samples, and thus our task is to detect the malicious samples. We
report the detection rate (DR), which is defined by the number of correctly clas-
sified malware APKs divided by the total number of out-of-sample test data.
After validating that these classifiers have high accuracy and low false positive
in Section 5.2, we use them to test on incoming samples. Under this practical
and realistic scenario, the test samples do not follow very similar distribution
as the training samples. In this case, the classifiers with high accuracy degrade,
sometimes even significantly, for out-of-sample testing.
Recall that the in-sample malicious behaviors include retrieving phone infor-
mation and sending to the network. Here we divide the out-of-sample experi-
ments into two types. First, a strong similarity of this malicious behavior from
the test set, which indicates that the distribution of the test set is similar to the
distribution of a subset in the training data. Second, a weaker similarity of this
malicious behavior from the test set, which indicates that the distribution of the
test set is even less similar to the distribution of the training data.
OOS1: Out-of-sample with malicious similarity to in-sample data We
first apply the five classifiers on a dataset of 12185 malicious APKs and report the
detection rate. These out-of-sample APKs exhibit similar malicious behaviors of
intercepting and sending messages without the user’s consent as in the training
set. To visualize this similarity, we conduct principal component analysis (PCA)
and inspect the scatter plots of the first four principal components (PC). Figure
3 presents the scatter plot of (PC1, PC2), (PC1, PC3), (PC2, PC3), and (PC1,
PC4). The in-sample benign files are plotted in green, the in-sample malicious
files are plotted in red and the out-of-sample malicious files are plotted in ma-
genta. (PC1, PC2)-scatter plot indicates the distributional dissimilarity between
the first two principal components, as the out-of-sample data almost forms its
own cluster. However (PC1, PC3), (PC2, PC3), and (PC1, PC4)-scatter plots
indicate that similarity still persists as the out-of-sample data falls within the
clusters of the in-sample data.
Fig. 3: OOS1: Scatter plot of principal components in OOS1. This out-of-sample set
is similarly distributed compared to the training set. The in-sample benign files are
plotted in green, the in-sample malicious files are plotted in red and the out-of-sample
malicious files are plotted in magenta. (PC1, PC2)-scatter plot indicates the distribu-
tional dissimilarity between the first two principal components, as the out-of-sample
data almost forms its own cluster. The rest of the PC-scatter plots show that the
out-of-sample data lies in the same embedding as the in-sample data.
The sixth column in Table 1 demonstrates the detection rates of the five
classifiers. Both SVM with linear kernel and MBSS have detection rate of 0.9,
while the performance of 3NN is 0.68 and LDA has the lowest detection rate
of 0.1. A dramatic performance degradation is seen for SVM with radial kernel,
which went from the best in-sample performing classifier to the worst classifier
with detection rate near 0. The significant degradation of LDA is due to its highly
parametric nature. In this case, SVM with linear kernel and MBSS maintain
relatively stable detection rate.
Next, we examine the detection rate as we vary the test size. We apply the
classifiers on the randomly selected {0.1%, 1%, 20%, 50%, 90%} of the test data
with independent Monte Carlo replications at {50, 30, 20, 10, 5, 1} respectively.
Monte Carlo replications are used to control the variation and thus provide better
estimate of the accuracy. The detection rate is reported by averaging over the
Monte Carlo replicates. As seen in Figure 4, both MBSS and SVM with linear
kernel are superior to other classifiers. We note that the performance variation,
as we increase the percentage of the test set, is negligible. This is because our
data processing of binarizing the features results in a high number of replicates
in the test data. Hence, the performance of the classifiers are seen relatively
stable here as we vary the test size.
Fig. 4: OOS1: Detection rate as we vary the test size. MBSS and SVM linear achive the
highest detection rate at 90% while the rest of the classifiers degrade in performance.
OOS2: Out-of-sample with dissimilar distribution to in-sample data
Our next out-of-sample experiment applies the five classifiers onto a dataset
of 11986 malicious APKs, whose malicious behaviors primary include stealing
private information, sending it to the Internet through commodity command
and control (C&C) server, but do not include dynamic code loading behavior.
Compared to the training set, these APKs share similarities in the malicious
behavior but have their own characteristics. Indeed, these APKs are considered
a malware family that is not in the training set.
This slight similarity in malicious behavior can been seen in the data distribu-
tion as reflected by the principal components achieved from principal component
analysis. Figure 5 presents the scatter plot of (PC1, PC2), (PC1, PC3), (PC2,
PC3), and (PC1, PC4). The in-sample benign files are plotted in green, the in-
sample malicious files are plotted in red and the out-of-sample malicious files are
plotted in magenta. (PC1, PC2)-scatter plot and (PC2, PC3)-scatter plot indi-
cate the distributional dissimilarity, as the out-of-sample data almost forms its
own cluster. However (PC1, PC3) and (PC1, PC4)-scatter plots indicate there
is still similarity, even though not as strong, since the out-of-sample data falls
within the clusters of the in-sample data.
Fig. 5: OOS2: Scatter plot of principal components in OOS2.This out-of-sample dataset
is not so similarly distributed compared to training set. The in-sample benign files are
plotted in green, the in-sample malicious files are plotted in red and the out-of-sample
malicious files are plotted in magenta. (PC1, PC2)-scatter plot and (PC2, PC3)-scatter
plot indicate the distributional dissimilarity, as the out-of-sample data almost forms
its own cluster. However (PC1, PC3) and (PC1, PC4)-scatter plots indicate there is
still similarity, even though not as strong, since the out-of-sample data falls within the
same embedding of the in-sample data.
The last right column in Table 1 demonstrates the detection performance
of the five classifiers. All classifiers degrade in performance. However SVM with
linear kernel degrades in performance significantly. The result of 3NN is omitted,
because it fails due to too many ties. MBSS performs significantly better than
the other classifiers.
Next, we vary the test size to examine the out-of-sample classification perfor-
mance. As we vary the test size, we apply the classifiers on the randomly selected
{0.1%, 1%, 20%, 50%, 90%} of the test data with independent Monte Carlo repli-
cations at {50, 30, 20, 10, 5, 1} respectively. Monte Carlo replications are used to
control the variation and thus provide better estimate of the accuracy. MBSS
performs significantly better than the rest at all test sizes, as seen in Figure 6.
The variation of the performance by these classifiers are negligible. Again this is
due to our data processing, which results in many duplicates in the test data.
6 Summary and Discussion
Automated malware detection on Android platforms has focused mainly on de-
veloping signature-based methods or machine learning methods on static data,
which may not capture the malicious behaviors exhibiting only during runtime.
Furthermore, producing ground truth via manual labeling is costly, while a vast
amount of unlabeled malware data already exists. The malware evolution pro-
Fig. 6: Detection rate as we vary the test size. All classifiers degrade in performance.
MBSS still performs significantly better the rest of the classifiers.
cess creates huge engineering problem for anti-virus researchers as they lack an
efficient way to capture potential new malicious files while pruning out those
clean files and known files. As a result, traditional supervised machine learning
algorithms can degrade in performance.
In this paper, we demonstrate the effectiveness of using model-based semi-
supervised learning (MBSS) approach on dynamic Android behavior data for
Android malware detection. We show that for in-sample testing, MBSS has com-
petitive accuracy and false positive rate compared with the most popular mal-
ware classifiers. For out-of-sample testing, MBSS produces significantly higher
detection rate compared with the other classifiers in consideration. We are op-
timistic that the framework of semi-supervised learning for dynamic analysis is
valuable and practical for anti-malware research.
investigation.
6.1 Application on Malware Triage
Malware triage is a known problem for security researchers. As malware evolves,
derivative malware families will continuously generate new signatures that escape
detection. This creates a huge engineering problem for anti-virus researchers, be-
cause they lack an efficient way to capture potential new malicious files while
pruning out those clean files and known files. A more sophisticated tool to pro-
cess massive amount of samples is desired by cybersecurity companies. This tool
should precisely triage samples into clusters and identify a subset of highly prob-
able malwares. Accordingly, the security experts can focus on a smaller subset
and spend time more efficiently.
One application of MBSS can be used for triaging samples and identifying
a subset of highly probable malware. With limited known malwares and much
more unknown samples in the field, Android malware detection models using
semi-supervised machine learning approach can accurately identify subset of
samples needed further investigation.
6.2 N-gram
There has been an increasing interest in employing natural language processing
techniques for malware detection. As a pre-processing step, N -gram is used to
extract the features based on N number of concatenated terms. With N > 1,
the feature size increases and potentially provides more discriminatory power in
classification. On the other hand, we caution the usage of N -gram as it is not
resilient against analytical attacks, which is encountered in adversarial machine
learning [30], a field concerning the security of machine learning. When using
(N > 1)-gram, one can break the N -gram feature patterns by injecting API calls,
and cause the machine learning algorithm to misclassify. Here we use uni-gram,
i.e., N = 1 as a robust mitigation to address the machine learning security.
6.3 Kernel Trick
In this study, we compare MBSS with SVM linear kernel, SVM radial kernel,
3NN and LDA. Essentially SVM employs kernel tricks to represent data not
separable in the current dimension, and embeds it into higher dimension, such
that the data becomes separable. This is the so-called kernel trick. We believe
that exploring other high-dimensional representation may also help enhance the
out-of-sample detection rate for SVM.
6.4 Limitation of our framework
Currently most detection methods for Android malware focus on developing
signature-based techniques, and machine learning methods have mainly focused
on static data. Static analysis provides the complete understanding of the code
all at once and is relatively faster to analyze compared to dynamic analysis.
However, static analysis are not resilient to obfuscation, since a significant por-
tion of the static samples as well as the main code within the static files are
usually encrypted. Simply dissembling the code statically does not expose the
malicious behavior. On the other hand, using behavior data records and cap-
tures the malware behavior during dynamic execution, and thus enables better
malware detection. However dynamic analysis has limited coverage, since there
is no guarantee to traverse all functions of an APK at runtime. Compared to
static analysis, the dynamic analysis is relatively slower.
The underlying assumption on the data distribution is mixture of Gaussians.
Though mixture of Gaussians can accommodate data with different forms, and
some non-Gaussian data can be approximated by a few Gaussian distributions
[22], we expect that if the data deviates from mixture of Gaussian distribution
greatly, the performance may degrade. Another limitation is on high-dimensional
data. The number of parameters grow as the square of the feature dimension. In
this case, dimension reduction methods such as principal component analysis is
desired.
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